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Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
NOV 7 1991 
CLERK SUPREME COUR" 
UTAH 
Re: Heslop v. Bank of Utah 
Civil No. 900532 
U.R.A.P. 24(j) Response and Letter 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
This letter constitutes a response on behalf of the Bank of 
Utah to Mr. Heslop1s October 31, 1991, Rule 24(j) letter. This 
letter also constitutes a Rule 24(j) letter on behalf of the Bank 
of Utah. 
P. 2d 
1. Response to Mr. Heslop1s Letter: 
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 168 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 
(Utah 1991) (filed September 5, 1991) discusses the 
implied-in-fact exception to the employment-at-will presumption. 
The issue of implied-in-fact contracts terminable only for good 
cause is raised in Point i.e. of the bank's initial brief and in 
Point I.B.2. of the bank's reply brief. 
Mr. Heslop!s 
v. Morton Thiokol, 
October 31, 1991, letter suggests that Johnson 
Inc., supra, counters the bank's argument in 
its reply brief that an employerfs course of conduct and 
pertinent oral representations are not relevant in determining 
the existence of an implied-in-fact contract where the language 
of an employee manual is not ambiguous, based on Brehany v. 
Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991). 
The majority opinion in Johnson did not overrule Brehany. 
Johnson specifically involved interpretation of terms of an 
employee manual. At footnote 15, the majority opinion states, in 
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part: 
While the existence of an agreement which 
forms the basis of an implied-in-fact 
contract provision is a question of fact, not 
all issues relating to implied employment 
contract provisions are factual questions. 
Indeed, we have held that when terms of an 
employee manual constitute an employment 
contract, the proper interpretation of the 
unambiguous terms of the manual is an issue 
for the court. 
2. Rule 24(j) Citation of New Authority: 
At pages 72-77 of Mr. Heslop!s initial brief, pages 8-19 of 
Heslopfs reply brief, and pages 20-25 of the bank's reply brief, 
the public policy exception to the at-will-employment rule is 
addressed. 
Heslop is seeking relief from this court in the form of 
reversal of the trial courtfs dismissal of his public policy 
claims. 
In Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., supra, at footnote 7, 
the majority opinion discussed the public policy exception as 
follows: 
There is dictum in Berube and in Hodges 
v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 
1991), suggesting that Justices Durham, 
Stewart, and Zimmerman would recognize a 
public policy exception to the at-will 
doctrine. . . . Such an exception would 
prevent employers from terminating employees 
for reasons that violate public policy. 
However, these justices do not agree on the 
nature of such an exception. . . . In any 
event, the public policy exception has yet to 
be clearly established in Utah. [emphasis 
added] 
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I have enclosed nine copies with this original in accordance 
with Rule 24(j ) . 
Very truly yours, 
STRONG & HANNI 
SHSrmrs 
cc: Ronald E. Griff in 
Byxi UMkA^yi\
 9rrc 
c
 Stuar t H. ^chul tz 
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